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Identity, Individuality, and Unity
E. J.  LOWE
I
In distinguishing between the primary and secondary qualities of
bodies in the Essay, Locke notoriously included number amongst the
first:1
The Qualities then that are in Bodies rightly considered, are of
Three Sorts. First, the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and
Motion, or Rest of their solid Parts ... These I call primary
Qualities. (II, VIII, 23) 
Later in the Essay, in the chapter entitled ‘Of Number’, he goes on
to say:
Amongst all the Ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the
Mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that of
Unity, or One: ... every Thought of our Minds brings this Idea
along with it. ... For Number applies it self to Men, Angels,
Actions, Thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be
imagined. (II, XVI, 1) 
Just as well-known as Locke’s view of number and unity is
Berkeley’s peremptory repudiation of that view, in his Principles of
Human Knowledge.2 There Berkeley asserts, concerning number:
That number is entirely the creature of the mind ... will be evi-
dent to whoever considers, that the same thing bears a different
denomination of number, as the mind views it with different
respects. Thus, the same extension is one or three or thirty-six,
according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot,
or an inch. ... We say one book, one page, one line; all these are
equally units, though some contain several of the others. (Part 1,
12) 
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1 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P. H.
Nidditch (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), from which edition all
quoted passages are taken.
2 Quoted passages are taken from George Berkeley, Philosophical Works,
M. R. Ayers (ed.) (London: Dent, 1975).
And in the next paragraph he continues, concerning unity:
Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded
idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any
such idea answering the word unity, I do not find; and if I had,
methinks I could not miss finding it; on the contrary it should be
the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to accom-
pany all other ideas. (13)
In his earlier work, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision,
Berkeley expresses similar contempt for Locke’s conceptions of
number and unity, again making the point that 
[N]umber ... is entirely the creature of the mind ... According as
the mind variously combines its ideas the unit varies: and as the
unit, so the number, which is only a collection of units,  doth also
vary. We call a window one, a chimney one, and yet a house in
which there are many windows and many chimneys hath an equal
right to be called one, and many houses go to the making of one
city. (109)
This passage is quoted, with apparent approval, by Frege in The
Foundations of Arithmetic—although, of course, Frege should not
be taken to concur with Berkeley’s suggestion that number is some-
how subjective, ‘entirely a creature of the mind’, in view of Frege’s
own vehement opposition to psychologism in the philosophy of
logic and mathematics.3 Frege’s agreement with  Berkeley extends
only as far as the latter’s rejection of the view that, as Frege puts it,
‘Number is a property of external things’ (p. 27). Frege’s own view
is that
[T]he content of a statement of number is an assertion about a
concept. This is perhaps clearest with the number 0. If I say
‘Venus has 0 moons’, there simply does not exist any moon or
agglomeration of moons for anything to be asserted of; but what
happens is that a property is assigned to the concept ‘moon of
Venus’, namely that of including nothing under it. If I say ‘the
King’s carriage is drawn by four horses’, then I assign the
number four to the concept ‘horse that draws the King’s car-
riage’. (p. 59)
Frege himself appeals, on several occasions, to the sort of consider-
ation that Berkeley adduces for rejecting Locke’s view of number,
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3 See Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin,
2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), p. 33, from which edition all subse-
quent quoted passages are taken.
namely that 
While looking at one and the same external phenomenon, I can
say with equal truth both ‘It is a copse’ and ‘It is five trees’, or
both ‘Here are four companies’ and ‘Here are 500 men’. (p. 59)
Here is another passage in which he makes the same point:
I am able to think of the Iliad either as one poem, or as 24 Books,
or as some large Number of verses. (p. 28)
And here is a third: 
The Number 1, ... or 100 or any other Number, cannot be said to
belong to [a] pile of playing cards in its own right, but at most to
belong to it in view of the way in which we have chosen to regard
it. (p. 29)
In this last case, the suggestion is that what is, from one point of
view, one pack of cards is, from another point of view, 52 cards,
while from yet another it is four suits, and so on. Even so, there is
every indication that Frege is ambivalent about endorsing Berkeley
in quite these terms—and not just on account of Berkeley’s subjec-
tivism concerning number. Rather, the problem is that it is not hard
to discern a latent incoherence in this way of putting things. The
incoherence is very near the surface in one of the passages from
Frege quoted a moment ago, where he says that ‘While looking at
one and the same external phenomenon, I can say with equal truth
“It is a copse” and “It is five trees”’. For how can Frege say that one
and the same ‘external phenomenon’ is both one copse and five
trees? (Admittedly, the German text reads ‘derselben äussern
Erscheinung’, so that Austin’s translation might be criticized for
having ‘one and the same’ instead of just ‘the same’: but the
difficulty is made only marginally less obvious by this amendment.)
What is this ‘it’ that is somehow both a single copse and five
different trees? Frege is clearly aware of the difficulty, for in first
presenting the example of the pack of cards he remarks: 
[I]f I place a pile of playing cards in [someone’s] hands with the
words: Find the Number of these, this does not tell him whether
I wish to know the number of cards, or of complete packs of
cards, or even say of honour cards at skat. To have given him the
pile in his hands is not yet to have given him completely the
object he is to investigate; I must add some further word—cards,
or packs, or honours. (pp. 28–9)
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Clearly, Frege does not really want to say, on his own account, that
one and the same thing can literally be both one and more than one.
This is why he admits, later, that
Several examples given earlier gave the false impression that dif-
ferent numbers may belong to the same thing. This is to be
explained by the fact that we were there taking objects to be what
has number. As soon as we restore possession to the rightful
owner, the concept, numbers reveal themselves as no less mutu-
ally exclusive in their own sphere than colours are in theirs. (p.
61)
It would seem, then, that Frege’s use of the controversial examples
is supposed to contribute towards a reductio ad absurdum of the view
that numbers are properties of objects. The idea seems to be that if
we suppose that numbers are properties of objects, then we shall
have to say that different numbers may, with equal legitimacy, be
assigned to the same object or objects: that, for example, the same
thing may be regarded as one pack of cards or as 52 cards. However,
the trouble is that, far from creating a difficulty for philosophers
like Locke, the argument, thus understood, rebounds against Frege
himself. Berkeley, it should be noted, used the contentious examples
to try to show that number is not a ‘primary quality’ of objects,
which they possess independently of the mind: it was no part of his
purpose to argue that number is not in any sense a property of
objects. But Frege clearly recognizes the incoherence of saying that
anything could be at once one thing and more than one thing and
that this incoherence does not go away simply by supposing that
number is somehow mind-dependent, or a matter of how we ‘view’
or ‘regard’ whatever it is to which we are assigning a number. If this
is incoherent, however, then it cannot be something to which any
philosopher is committed simply in virtue of supposing that num-
ber is a property of objects or things, as opposed to Fregean con-
cepts. Rather, the philosopher who takes the former view must
clearly just insist that, for example, one pack of cards cannot be
identified with 52 different cards, even though it may, of course, con-
sist of 52 different cards.
Frege’s own contribution to our understanding of identity state-
ments and his introduction of the notion of a criterion of identity,
far from making difficulties for Locke’s view of number, actually
aid the adherent of that view to rebut the sort of objection that
Berkeley advances. Cards and packs of cards are kinds of things that
are governed by quite different identity criteria, with the conse-
quence that it makes no sense to say that something could fall under
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both of the sortal concepts card and pack of cards.4 (‘Sortal’ is, of
course, a term of Locke’s own coinage.) A fortiori, then, something
cannot intelligibly be assigned the number one inasmuch as it is
regarded as falling under the concept pack of cards and the number
52 inasmuch as it is regarded as falling under the concept card. The
upshot of all this is that Frege’s frequent appeal to the sort of objec-
tion to Locke’s view of number that we find in Berkeley is entirely
broken-backed.
II
Frege has related remarks about the notion of unity which are
equally unsatisfactory, although in this case we may also take issue
with what Locke himself says on the matter. Berkeley, as we saw
earlier, expresses contempt for Locke’s suggestion that the idea of
unity accompanies every other idea, saying that he can find no such
idea in his own mind. Part of what Locke is suggesting, clearly, is
that everything whatever that exists or could exist is ‘one’ or a ‘unit’:
that simply in virtue of being self-identical and distinct from any-
thing else, everything has ‘unity’. But Frege is just as contemptuous
as Berkeley about this suggestion. Sarcastically, he comments:
It must strike us immediately as remarkable that every single
thing should possess this property [of being ‘one’] ... It is only in
virtue of the possibility of something not being wise that it makes
sense to say ‘Solon is wise’. The content of a concept diminishes
as its extension increases; if its extension becomes all-embracing,
its content must vanish altogether. It is not easy to imagine how
language could have come to invent a word for a property which
could not be of the slightest use for adding to the description of
any object whatsoever. (p. 40)
This argument, too, backfires on Frege. In fact, in Austin’s transla-
tion, the first sentence in the passage just quoted looks manifestly
absurd: ‘It must strike us immediately as remarkable that every sin-
gle thing should possess this property [of being “one”]’—for what
is a ‘single’ thing if not, precisely, one thing? Singularity and uni-
tariness are, if not identical concepts, at least intimately related.
And is the concept of singularity somehow left devoid of content if
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4 I defend this thesis quite generally in my Kinds of Being: A Study of
Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms (Oxford: Blackwell,
1989), ch. 4.
we suppose that everything exhibits singularity? I ask this question
without presuming that such a supposition is correct, for in point of
fact I think that the supposition can certainly be challenged, for rea-
sons that I shall give later. My point here is merely that one could
not legitimately convict a philosopher of incoherence or vacuity for
contending that everything that there is is singular in character.
However, it would be unfair to press this objection to Frege simply
on the strength of Austin’s translation, for the translation is mis-
leading at this point. Frege’s original words do not contain anything
translatable as ‘single’ or ‘singular’. The sentence in question reads,
in German, simply as follows: ‘Auffallend wäre zunächst, dass jedes
Ding diese Eigenschaft hätte’. Nonetheless, the general point still
stands, that it is a poor argument against a putative concept that
those who profess to deploy it suppose it to apply to everything
whatever. Most philosophers (and, clearly, even Frege himself)
would accept that the concept of self-identity applies to everything
whatever, but they cannot be convicted on that account of evacuat-
ing the concept of all content.
Frege supplements the poor argument that I have just criticized
by urging that ‘Solon was one’ does not make sense in anything like
the way that ‘Solon was wise’ does, because the former is not ‘intel-
ligible on its own in isolation’ (p. 40). He goes on:
This is even clearer if we take the plural. Whereas we can com-
bine ‘Solon was wise’ and ‘Thales was wise’ into ‘Solon and
Thales were wise’, we cannot say ‘Solon and Thales were one’.
But it is hard to see why this should be impossible, if ‘one’ were
a property both of Solon and of Thales in the same way that
‘wise’ is. (pp. 40–1)
However, the natural and correct response to this is to point out that
being one is necessarily a property only of single things, whereas
Solon and Thales are not a single thing: rather, they are two things,
whence they possess the property of being two. (This will become
clearer shortly, when we come to discuss pluralities.) It remains the
case that we can still say, quite truly, ‘Solon and Thales were each
one’, while also saying, with equal truth, ‘Solon and Thales
(together) were two’. The fact that Solon and Thales were two, even
though Solon was not two and Thales was not two, is no more
puzzling than the fact, say, that Smith and Jones moved the piano,
even though Smith did not move the piano and Jones did not move
the piano (the piano being too heavy for one person to move). Any
oddity that attaches to sentences like ‘Solon was one’ and ‘Solon and
Thales were two’ is, I suggest, purely pragmatic in character,
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arising from the fact that the applicability of the predicate is already
apparent from the grammatical form of the subject, so that such
sentences appear to be stating the obvious. However, what is
obvious is not precluded from being both meaningful and true.   
Even so, the suggestion that everything has the property of being
one—that everything is one thing—might be questioned on the
ground that the numbers, including the number one, are used in
counting things, but that it makes no sense to count things as such,
since we can only count things of specifiable sorts or kinds. This,
indeed, was the implication of Frege’s remarks, quoted earlier, con-
cerning the pile of cards, and the indeterminacy of the instruction
to ‘Find the Number of these’. One needs to be told whether one is
to count the packs, or the cards, or the honour cards, or whatnot.
However, while there is something that is right about what Frege
says in this connection, there is also something that is wrong or at
least misleading. It is wrong, and obviously so, to suppose that one
cannot include things of many different kinds in a single count. I
could quite coherently ask someone to count the packs and the
cards, for instance. If there were 52 cards and four complete suits,
then the answer to the question ‘What is the number of packs and
cards?’ would be 53. This would be an odd question to ask, but not
an unintelligible or unanswerable one. Similarly, it would make per-
fectly good sense to ask how many children and books there were in
a certain classroom. On the other hand, it is not so easy to make
sense of an instruction, say, to count the cards and the honour cards,
simply because each honour card is a card and we presumably ought
to avoid double-counting. Even so, given a suitable disambiguation
of this instruction, it too could be coherently carried out. Indeed,
on the most reasonable interpretation of it, the answer would seem
to be, in the case envisaged, 52—in other words, that there are just
as many cards and honour cards as there are cards.5
Where problems of principle arise in matters of counting is
where we are expected, somehow, to include in the count items that
do not qualify as single things. For many philosophers—including, it
would appear, Locke—no such problem can ever arise, precisely
because, in their view, everything whatever that exists or could exist
is a single thing. However, as I have already indicated, this view can
certainly be challenged. And, of course, anyone who does challenge
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5 For a recent repudiation of the thesis that it is somehow incoherent to
inquire, without qualification, into ‘the number of things’, see Peter van
Inwagen, ‘The Number of Things’, Philosophical Issues 12 (2002), pp.
176–96.
it will not be vulnerable to Frege’s objection, for what it is worth,
that it is vacuous to attribute ‘oneness’ to objects because this is a
property that everything would have to have.
But, it will now be asked, how can it make sense to say that some-
thing might fail to be one, singular, or unitary—fail to possess one-
ness, singularity, or unitariness? If the question were how some
thing could fail to be one, singular, or unitary, then I might indeed
be inclined to dismiss as incoherent the thought that there could be
any such failure, because the concept of a ‘thing’ seems already to
have the notion of singularity or unitariness built into it. However,
while ‘Everything is something’ is, apparently, a trivial truth of
logic, ‘Everything is some thing’ looks like a more substantive meta-
physical claim. 
One reason for denying that everything is a thing is that the
world, as well as containing individual things, contains pluralities of
things—and a plurality of things is not a single thing. Indeed, if we
are to take seriously Locke’s suggestion that number is a property of
things, then, clearly, the only number that can be assigned to a sin-
gle thing—Berkeley’s objection having been repudiated—is one.
And this means, of course, that numbers other than one can only be
assigned to more than one thing—that is, to pluralities of things. We
say, for example, and quite properly, that the planets are nine in
number, as are the muses. In the sentence ‘The planets are nine’, the
subject term, ‘the planets’, refers plurally to Mercury, Venus, Mars,
Earth, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune and Pluto, and the predi-
cate attributes the property of being nine to that plurality. We
should not be misled here by the fact that the expression ‘that plu-
rality’ is grammatically singular in form. This is a mere idiosyn-
crasy of idiom and does not signify that there is some further thing,
‘the plurality of the planets’, in addition to the planets themselves.
When I suggest that pluralities provide a plausible exception to the
thesis that ‘Everything is a thing’, I mean just this: pluralities exist,
and yet, manifestly, are not single things. For instance, the planets
exist, and yet are not one thing. To the extent, then, that the so-
called universal quantifier, expressed in English by means of the
word ‘everything’, ranges at least over what exists, it ranges over
pluralities as well as over single things, given that pluralities exist.
Hence it is true to say that not everything is a thing.
But this is not the only reason for denying that everything is a
thing. Pluralities of individual things can at least be assigned a
number. The planets are nine and the books of the Iliad are 24. To
avoid potential confusion, let us henceforth use the term ‘entity’ to
denote anything whatever that does or could exist, whether or not it
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is an individual thing. Then, I want to say, there are or could be
entities to which numbers cannot even in principle be assigned. One
of the most plausible supporting examples for this thesis is provid-
ed by quantities of matter, especially if these are conceived as homo-
geneous and infinitely divisible. Such a quantity of matter might
seem to be a good candidate for being a plurality—but it cannot, it
seems, be a plurality of individual things. This is because, although
it includes distinct entities, each of the entities that it includes is in
turn a (lesser) quantity of matter. If all quantities of matter were
ultimately made up of indivisible atoms—which may be something
like the truth as far as the actual physical world is concerned—then
they would indeed be very good candidates for being pluralities,
namely, pluralities of atoms. (Locke himself was sympathetic to
atomism, of course.) But it doesn’t really make sense, it would
seem, to talk of a plurality which is not a plurality of individual
things, since the concept of a plurality is tied to that of number and
where there are no individual things no number can meaningfully
be assigned. 
We need, it would seem, a new ontological term to apply to enti-
ties such as our hypothetical quantities of homogeneous and infi-
nitely divisible matter. We could call them, perhaps, dividuals.6
Dividuals cannot be assigned numbers—neither the number one
nor any greater number. They are not single things, nor are they
pluralities. Yet dividuals may be distinguished: the quantity of mat-
ter in one bowl may be wholly distinct from the quantity of matter
in another bowl. Any proper part of a quantity of matter is a quan-
tity of matter which is distinct from the whole of which it is a part
and distinct, too, from other proper parts of that same whole. To
avoid any misunderstanding here, it must be emphasized that a
quantity of matter is not the same as a piece of matter. A piece of
matter is an individual thing, composed of matter that is gathered
together to make a single connected whole. That same quantity of
matter could be divided and separated in infinitely many different
ways, without thereby ceasing to exist. It would continue to exist
even if it were scattered across the entire universe. A piece of mat-
ter, on the other hand, continues to exist only so long as the quanti-
ty of matter composing it remains gathered together.
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6 I am not sure whether this term has been used by anyone else before
me, but I first used it myself in my ‘Primitive Substances’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 54 (1994), pp. 531–52. See also my The
Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 161.
I have just said that numbers—and here I mean cardinal num-
bers, quite generally—cannot be assigned to dividuals. But there is,
of course, a perfectly good sense in which numbers can be assigned
to dividuals, such as quantities of matter. For we can say, concern-
ing a certain quantity of matter, how much of it there is and assign a
number to this amount, given an appropriate choice of units for the
purposes of measurement. (Here we may in principle need recourse
not just to integral or rational numbers but to real numbers, given
the hypothesized infinite divisibility of quantities of matter.) So, for
example, if we use kilogrammes as our units of mass, we may say
that there are 2·35 kilogrammes of matter in the bowl. However, it
is important to appreciate that in thus assigning a number to the
quantity of matter in the bowl, we are focusing on just one physical
property of the matter, its mass. After all, we might alternatively
want to assign a number to the volume of the quantity of matter
rather than to its mass. So, what we are measuring and thus assign-
ing numbers to is not really the mere quantity of matter as such but,
rather, certain of its properties, such as its mass or its volume. It
would seem that there are and can be no ‘units’ for measuring how
much matter, as such, a quantity of matter is. And, in any case, it is
clear that the sense in which we can assign numbers to quantities of
matter is completely distinct from that in which we can assign num-
bers to pluralities of individual things and in no way undermines
the ontological distinction that I just have proposed between indi-
viduals and dividuals.    
III
So far, I have mainly been concerned to defend the Lockean view
that number is a property of objects against Frege’s view that num-
ber is a property of concepts. (Of course, in this connection it is
important to appreciate that Frege thinks of concepts as being
objective and mind-independent, and hence as being quite distinct
from the psychological entities that Locke and Berkeley call ‘ideas’.)
Even the most ardent supporter of Frege must surely concede that
Frege’s view on this matter is relatively counter-intuitive—and,
after all, he himself implicitly pays tribute to the intuitiveness of
the Lockean view in spending so much effort to convince us of its
falsehood. One consideration which, as a passage quoted earlier
indicates, seems to have weighed heavily with Frege is the apparent
problem confronted by the Lockean view in the case of the number
0. As Frege remarks, ‘If I say “Venus has 0 moons”, there simply
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does not exist any moon or agglomeration of moons for anything to
be asserted of’. In other words, even if we can maintain that the
property of being one is a property that an object can (and indeed
must) possess and that numbers greater than one can be possessed
by pluralities of objects, it seems that there plainly can’t be any
object that possesses the property of being zero. By contrast, the
concept moon of Venus clearly can have assigned to it the property
of ‘including nothing under it’, which is how Frege recommends us
to think of something’s having the number 0. Moreover, this way of
thinking of the bearers of numerical properties famously enables
him to forge a link between distinctions of number and quantifica-
tional distinctions, as expressed by words like ‘all’, ‘some’, and
‘none’. This in turn enables him to observe that
[E]xistence is analogous to number. Affirmation of existence is in
fact nothing but denial of the number nought. Because existence
is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the exis-
tence of God breaks down. (p. 65)
How can an adherent of Locke’s view of number respond to these
points? Well, first of all, it may be pointed out that, although it
comes very naturally to a mathematician to think of ‘zero’ as denot-
ing a number, most ordinary folk would consider it at best a bad
joke to be told that, say, there is a number of pound notes in a sealed
envelope that has just been given to them, when in fact the envelope
is empty. The response ‘Well, I did say a number of pound notes,
and nought is a number’ would do nothing to pacify the irate recip-
ient. The introduction of the zero symbol was undoubtedly an
important landmark in the history of mathematics, but we should
not assume that its utility in calculation is dependent upon its actu-
ally denoting some object or expressing some property. In particu-
lar, we should not uncritically accept the currently standard view
that ‘zero’ denotes the empty set, because it is far from clear that the
notion of such a set really makes sense. All that we are ever
informed about the empty set is that it is (1) a set, (2) has no mem-
bers, and (3) is unique amongst sets in having no members.
However, there are very many things that ‘have no members’, in the
set-theoretical sense—namely, all non-sets. It is perfectly clear why
these things have no members, for they are not sets. What is unclear
is how there can be, uniquely amongst sets, a set which has no
members. We cannot conjure such an entity into existence by mere
stipulation—although this is, in effect, what Frege himself does
with respect to the number nought.
Frege defines the number nought as follows:
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Since nothing falls under the concept ‘not identical with itself’, I
define nought as follows: 0 is the Number which belongs to the
concept ‘not identical with itself’. (p. 87)
But what entitles him to suppose that anything exists which satisfies
this definition? Here he can appeal to another definition, namely, his
general definition of Number:
[T]he Number which belongs to the concept F is the extension of
the concept ‘equal to the concept F’ (pp. 79–80),
where, as he has already explained, a concept F is ‘equal’ to a con-
cept G just in case it is possible to ‘correlat[e] one to one the objects
which fall under the one concept with those which fall under the
other’ (p. 79). From this and the previous definition it follows that
0 is the extension of the concept ‘equal to the concept “not identi-
cal with itself”’. But what entitles Frege to suppose that the ‘exten-
sion’ of this concept exists? Well, the notorious Axiom V of Frege’s
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik will give him what he needs, since that
axiom says, in effect, that the extension of the concept F is identi-
cal with the extension of the concept G if and only if all and only
the objects which fall under F also fall under G—and this in turn
implies that every concept has an extension. But that, of course, is
what brings about the downfall of Axiom V, because it thereby falls
victim to Russell’s paradox.7
However, the so-called ‘neo-logicists’ think that Frege has the
resources with which to proceed in another and more satisfactory
way, by appealing not to Axiom V but to his own criterion of iden-
tity for cardinal numbers—a criterion which now often goes by the
name of ‘Hume’s principle’ and is expressible in the form ‘The
number which belongs to the concept F is identical with the num-
ber which belongs to the concept G if and only if it is possible to
correlate one to one the objects which fall under the concept F with
those which fall under the concept G’. Then he can ‘prove’ the exis-
tence of the number nought by taking both ‘F’ and ‘G’ in Hume’s
principle to stand for ‘not identical with itself’, to give us as a sup-
posedly true equivalence ‘The number which belongs to the con-
cept “not identical with itself” is identical with the number which
belongs to the concept “not identical with itself” if and only if there
are exactly as many non-self-identical things as there are non-self-
identical things’. Since what stands on the righthand side of this
equivalence is an analytic and indeed logical truth, what stands on
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the left is true, given that the equivalence itself is true. But what
stands on the left entails ‘There is something that is identical with
the number which belongs to the concept “not identical with
itself”’. However, since Frege has just defined nought as the num-
ber which belongs to the concept ‘not identical with itself’, it fol-
lows from this that there is something that is the number nought—
in other words, that the number nought exists.8 What is remarkable
is that Frege imagined that he could, one way or another, pull this
particular rabbit out of the hat so shortly after having criticized
adherents of the ontological argument for doing something very
similar in the case of God.
The proper response to all of this, it seems to me, is to deny
Hume’s principle, at least in its Fregean formulation. I am happy to
accept an alternative formulation, to the effect that pluralities whose
members are one-one correlatable are equinumerous, or possess the
same number. Taking a single object to be the limiting or degener-
ate case of a plurality, this allows us to say that every single object
possesses the number one. But since the notion of a ‘null’ plurality
is a manifest absurdity, we are not committed to existence of ‘the
number nought’. A particularly objectionable feature of Hume’s
principle in its Fregean formulation, from an ontological point of
view, is that it entails (in conjunction with a definition of ‘succes-
sor’) not only the existence of the number nought, as defined by
Frege, but the existence of infinitely many cardinal numbers, name-
ly, all the successors of the number nought. Some philosophers
clearly think that this is, on the contrary, a great virtue of Frege’s
version of Hume’s principle, since it gives them mathematical
objects on the cheap. But in serious ontology there is no such thing
as a free lunch. (Of course, it should also be remarked that invoking
the name of Hume in this connection is highly misleading, in any
case, since Hume himself did not appear to have anything like
Frege’s criterion of identity for cardinal numbers in mind when he
wrote the passage cited by Frege, namely, that ‘When two numbers
are so combined as that the one has always an unit answering to
every unit of the other, we pronounce them equal’ (p. 73).9 Hume
seems to have in mind, rather, a method for determining, for arbi-
trarily chosen natural numbers n, n’, m, and m’, whether or not (n +
n’) = (m + m’), e.g., whether or not (7 + 5) = (9 + 3).)
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8 Precisely this proof may be found in Wright, Frege’s Conception of
Numbers as Objects, pp. 158–9.
9 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge
and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Bk I, Part III, sect.
1 [p. 71].
But what are we to say about the linkage, forged by Frege,
between numerical notions and the notions of quantification and
existence? In particular, if we reject his view of number, should we
also reject his view of the meaning of existential statements?
According to Frege, existence is a ‘second-level’ concept. Thus, in
‘On Concept and Object’ he remarks:10
I have called existence a property of a concept. How I mean this
to be taken is best made clear by an example. In the sentence
‘there is at least one square root of 4’, we have an assertion ...
about a concept, square root of 4; viz. that it is not empty. (pp.
48–9)
And a little later:
I do not want to say it is false to assert about an object what is
asserted here about a concept; I want to say it is impossible,
senseless, to do so. The sentence ‘there is Julius Caesar’ is neither
true nor false but senseless. (p. 50)
However, ‘Julius Caesar exists’ seems to make perfectly good sense
and is most improbably analysed as meaning anything like, say,
‘There is at least one thing that is identical with Julius Caesar’, even
if it entails the latter. That is to say, it is most implausible to suggest
that in affirming Julius Caesar’s existence we mean to affirm, about
the concept identical with Julius Caesar, that it is ‘not empty’. In any
case, in what does the ‘non-emptiness’ of such a concept consist?
Surely, simply in the being of something which ‘falls under it’. But
all that can ‘fall under it’ is an object—in this case, Julius Caesar. So
the non-emptiness of this particular concept can only consist in the
being—the existence—of Julius Caesar. More generally, far from its
being the case that existence is to be explained in terms of the ‘non-
emptiness’ of concepts, quite the reverse seems most plausible—
that the ‘non-emptiness’ of concepts, which is a technical rather
than a common-sense notion, calls out for explanation in terms of
the existence of objects falling under them. The proper conclusion
to draw is that existence, like number, is a property of objects. The
fact that these properties are very unlike commonplace empirical
properties, such as the physical properties of colour and shape, is
neither here nor there. The same is true of such ‘formal’ properties
as the property of being self-identical, the property of being an
object and, indeed, the property of being a property. 
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10 See Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 2nd
edn, P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960).
IV
Where now does this leave us with regard to the key ontological
notions of identity, individuality and unity mentioned in the title of
this paper? The general position that I wish to recommend may be
summarized as follows. Not every entity that does or could exist is
an individual object of some kind, although every entity is neces-
sarily self-identical. An individual object is an entity which, quite
literally, counts as one entity of some kind, in order to do which it
must possess unity. Only unitary entities can qualify as individual or
single objects, capable in principle of being enumerated along with
other such objects. There are or could be entities which lack unity,
which we might call dividuals, as opposed to individuals. Putative
examples of such entities are quantities of homogeneous and infi-
nitely divisible matter. This distinction between dividuals and indi-
viduals is reflected in ordinary language in the distinction between
mass nouns and count nouns or, in an alternative terminology,
between mass terms and sortal terms. 
Both dividuals and individuals may have parts, but the parts of
dividuals are further dividuals and need not be unified in any way.
In contrast, a composite individual—one that has proper parts—
must have parts that are integrated according to some principle that
is characteristic of individuals of its kind. For example, an animal,
such as a tiger, is a composite individual of such a kind that it must
have organic parts that are spatially and causally connected so as to
enable them to function in the right sort of way to sustain the life of
the individual animal that they compose. Typically, the parts of a
composite individual of a given kind are individuals of various
other kinds—as, for example, the parts of a tiger include such things
as its heart, eyes, stomach, legs, and so forth.
Only individuals are countable. Each individual counts as one—
that is, as one thing of its kind. No individual can count as more
than one. Only pluralities of individuals can count as more than
one. Although a composite individual, such as an individual pack of
cards, may have many parts, the composite individual itself can still
only count as one. What counts as more than one in such a case is
not the composite individual but a plurality of its parts. Since the
parts of a composite individual may themselves have parts, which
are also parts of the composite individual in question (since part-
hood is transitive), there may be many different pluralities of parts
that may be said to compose the same individual. Thus, for exam-
ple, an individual tiger is composed by its various organs and limbs,
but is also composed by a plurality of atomic and sub-atomic
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particles. The different pluralities composing the same composite
individual may very well have different numbers assignable to
them. But, once more, the composite individual itself may only be
assigned the number one.  
It is possible, at least in principle, for an individual to be com-
posed of dividuals—as, for example, a piece of homogeneous and
infinitely divisible matter would be composed by quantities of
homogeneous and infinitely divisible matter. Dividuals, such as
quantities of homogeneous and infinitely divisible matter, possess
self-identity and are determinately distinct from one another and
from all individuals. And yet, as we have seen, they lack unity and
consequently are uncountable—not in the sense that they are
uncountably many, like the real numbers, but rather in the sense
that cardinal numbers are not assignable to them. They cannot
comprise pluralities in the way that individuals do. Locke was right
to say that number is a property of objects. But he was wrong to
assert that ‘Number applies it self to Men, Angels, Actions,
Thoughts, every thing that either doth exist, or can be imagined’
(II, XVI, 1). For number does not apply to dividuals and yet divid-
uals can at least be imagined.11
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11 I am grateful for comments received when this paper was presented at
the Royal Institute of Philosophy symposium on ‘Being One’, held at the
University of Manchester in December 2002.
